National Issues

 

 

 

 

The Ukrainian diaspora as a clearly defined phenomenon has been in existence since the early eighteenth century after the battle of Poltava, although emigration to foreign lands began even earlier. However, numbers have been very difficult to estimate in the past. With the fall of the "iron curtain," and, in particular, the demise of the USSR, as well as the formation of an independent Ukrainian state, the diaspora has become much more viable as a separate entity and certainly, much easier to define. Today, Ukrainians residing outside of Ukraine, by relatively conservative estimates number more than 18 million people, with approximately 10 million within the Russian Federation alone. Its most striking characteristics are its lack of homogeneity and the fact that it truly encompasses the entire globe.

 

Aside from the Russian Federation large numbers of Ukrainians populate Belarus - 1.5 million, the United States of America - 1 million, Canada - 1 million, Kazakhstan - .7 million, Moldova/Trandniester - .65 million, Brazil - .5 million, Poland - .4 million, Argentina - .3 million, Uzbekistan - .3 million, and Portugal/Spain .3 million. The remainder are found in Western Europe (United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, France, Scandinavia, Benelux), Eastern Europe (Romania, Slovakia, Baltic states, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia) and Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) and Australia.

 

The lack of homogeneity is illustrated best, perhaps, within the Russian Federation. The Federation is quite diverse and its Ukrainian element is a result of immigrations, forced settlements and dislocations varied in time and cause. A glaring example in this respect are the three Siberian oblasts of Omsk, Tomsk and Novosibirsk. Some of the earliest Ukrainians settled there some time after the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654. Most recently, a number of  emigres have come in following Ukrainian independence since Siberia with its vast resources and a vibrant economy offers economic opportunities. In between are descendants of economic opportunities in the latter half of the 19th century, the early part of the twentieth as well as heirs of political enemies of the USSR from the 1930's through the 1950's send to Siberia for punishment and rehabilitation. National awareness is often a result of these two variables - time and cause. For example, many descendants of the earliest economic settlers call themselves "khahly," a term which we deem derogatory, but which seems acceptable to them. They define it as a term which merely means little Russian or Ukrainian, different from a great Russian within the context of a brotherhood of peoples who trace their roots to Kyivan Rus. On the other hand, descendants of political settlers and new immigrants erect community structures, establish lines of communication with government officials and attempt to avail themselves of democratic processes, i.e. raising national awareness for the October 2002 census.

 

The city of Moscow is a phenomenon unto itself. It is not possible to compare living conditions between people in the capital and almost anywhere else in Russia, and, especially in villages. Some 75% of Russia's wealth is located in Moscow. Ukrainians in Moscow tend to be better off economically, more nationally astute and even politically connected with access to Russian ministries and Ukraine's diplomatic missions. A Ukrainian cultural center funded by the government of Ukraine is a prominent edifice in the center of Moscow on the old Arbat street with a bookstore and restaurant. Additionally, the community boasts a library and now a modest Ukrainian language class at the Liquistics Lyseum.

 

 Another distinction in diaspora communities deals with the indigenous versus emigre phenomena. The Russian Federation, Belarus, Romania, Slovakia and Romania today include lands considered by Ukrainians, at least, ethnographically Ukrainian. Thus a Ukrainian in Kuban, Russian Federation is indigenous, while one in Siberia is an emigre. Similarly, a Ukrainian in Brest, Belarus is indigenous, while one in Minsk is an emigre. A Ukrainian in southern Bukovyna, Romania is indigenous while one in Bucharest in an emigre. A Ukrainian in Przezow, Slovakia is indigenous, while one in Bratislava is an emigre. A Ukrainian in Przemysl, Poland is indigenous while one in Warsaw is an emigre. Aside from a higher concentration in the case of the indigenous populations, this distinction is becoming largely irrelevant given the world community's recognition of existing borders as almost every country includes lands formerly belonging to another.

 

The differences between the various Ukrainian diaspora communities are even more palpable in terms of economic deficiencies. This is true particularly, with communities in the "Eastern diaspora", and more in the former USSR than the satellites. Ukrainians in Kazakhstan are at the bottom of the economic ladder. The average income for pensioners there is somewhere between $15-20 per month. This may appear surprising given Kazakhstan's potential energy and other natural resources. Unfortunately, potential is overwhelmed by government corruption at the highest levels. The demise of socialism and the introduction of a market economy have resulted in an oligarchic society with little attention to the needs of the masses. While Ukraine has received much criticism in the West for being corrupt, Ukraine's oligarchs are benign by comparison with many of the central Asian republics. Additionally, Ukraine does possess an anti-corruption program, however ineffective. Historically, corruption has inhibited real progress over the long term. South America despite its potential and even long term democratic institutions has failed to achieve economic prosperity because of corruption. In Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Venezuela, South American countries inhabited by Ukrainians one finds some very rich people, including Ukrainian but there is little middle class. Thus even Ukrainians in the Western diaspora (South America) seek rather than offer assistance.

 

Cultural deficiencies are next in terms of needs that require attention. Again, Russia is a glaring example. Despite the large number of Ukrainians, the Russian government does not fund a single full time Ukrainian language primary school. Compare that with 3,500 Russian language full time primary schools funded by the Ukrainian government in Ukraine. Russian law allows for Ukrainian language classes in Russian schools where 25 parents sign a petition. As a result several Ukrainian language classes have sprouted in the Russian Federation, i.e. Moscow, Tomsk etc. Unfortunately, that law is not promulgated widely and therefore Ukrainian communities do not avail themselves of this option. In any event, learning Ukrainian seems to be a dead end as higher education in Ukrainian is not possible in Russia, and, continuing studies at higher education institutions in Ukraine itself is not an alternative given Ukraine's economic malaise, its own struggle to develop Ukrainian scholarship and the lack of programs for foreign students of Ukrainian ethnicity. Similar problems exist in other countries where no funding is available and Ukrainian is not an attractive option. Even in Poland which has manifested a strong resolve to become democratic and despite the overwhelming support of President Kwasniewski, being Ukrainian is not an avenue towards career enhancement. In Belarus, government policies are stifling and Ukrainians are viewed negatively as potential separatists. In the Slovak Republic the government attempts to play the Ukrainian/Rusyn dichotomy in order to weaken both, assimilate and eliminate any potential separatism involving Pryashivshchyna, although that is hardly a consideration for the Ukrainian or Rusyn element.

 

Freedom of religion as a human right and an element of cultural development suffers as well. Religious persecution is so apparent in Russia's law on religion that it has been criticized widely by the world community. The Russian Federation's law on religion in theory recognizes four denominations: Russian Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism. In practice, regional administrations register other denominations such as Protestant, Roman Catholic etc. However, Ukrainian Orthodoxy or Ukrainian Catholicism is not tolerated. In certain instances Ukrainians worship as Russian Orthodox or Roman Catholics. An attempt to register a Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate in Noginsk, Russia was met by violent repression from the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate. Russian government officials refused to intervene, disingenuously, motivating their restraint with church-state separation arguments. Ukrainian Catholics in Omsk oblast are registered as a German Roman Catholic church. Less egregious but still persecutory are Poland and Slovakia. Both try to "Latinize" Ukrainian Catholicism. Restitution of community and church property to Ukrainians is a laborious and often abortive process. Compare that with Ukraine where some 8,500 parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate operate freely with government sanction and support.

 

Finally, assimilation is a problem even in the United States, Canada, Western Europe and Australia. Demographic studies have shown that in these countries less than 20% of the Ukrainian population speaks Ukrainian fluently. This has been ameliorated somewhat by a tremendous influx of new immigrants from Ukraine at the expense of Ukraine itself where the population has fallen below 49 million. This influx, however, has not resulted in an appreciable increase in activity by the Western diaspora, since the "old guard" is in decline and its children are nowhere. Baby boomers in the West have distinguished themselves with little except self gratification. Perhaps, the problem stems from relevance - to what degree is being Ukrainian relevant to one's existence, and, in addition, how important is it to speak and write Ukrainian. The establishment of an independent Ukraine even with all its deficiencies, but with geo-strategic importance has done much to foster a national awareness within the Western diaspora. Ukraine's future as a significant democratic market will determine the level of enthusiasm within its Western diaspora. .

 

The Ukrainian diaspora indeed stretches the globe. Ukrainians reside from Anchorage, Alaska east to Vladivostok, Russian Federation or Melbourne, Australia. Locations unknown as Ukrainian enclaves albeit small such as Zurich, Tokyo, Beijing have sprouted. To date these enclaves lack structures. Nevertheless, representatives of these communities participate often in all-Ukrainian events such as the most recent III World Forum of Ukrainians held in Kyiv, August 2001. The significance of this phenomenon is that demographics are dynamic and require constant attention.

 

Unfortunately, Ukraine's relationship with its diaspora has been erratic at best. With independence, the government of Ukraine initiated the formation of a hybrid governmental/non-governmental organization the World Ukrainian Coordinating Council (WUCC). The WUCC has been disappointing. One theory suggests that this structure was instituted in order to provide the government with some measure of influence over the diaspora. The leadership put in place was chosen for its malleability, rather than competency. Others have suggested that the WUCC was instituted strictly to create a perception of concern with no regard as to efficacy. Equally disappointing has been the juggling of ministries, state committees and now the foreign ministry in order to deal with the diaspora. A program for the diaspora ending in 2000 was never implemented. So in September 2001 a more ambitious new program earmarked until 2005 was introduced, however bereft of budgetary allocations. A bill on the status (rights and privileges) of foreign Ukrainians (residing outside Ukraine) has been introduced in the Verkhovna Rada and has stalled there.

 

The most significant deficiency has been Ukraine's apparent lack of concern for the diaspora, particularly, the Eastern segment. The Western diaspora has offered a measure of financial and political support to the government of Ukraine and the government upon occasion has availed itself of that support. It is important to note that even in efforts of mutual concern and cooperation, each side (Ukraine and Western diaspora representatives) proceed most gingerly, not so much careful so as not to overstep as careful not trusting the other side fully. The Eastern diaspora offers Ukraine neither political clout nor financial resources. Altruism or national awareness and concern is not the mantra of today's leadership in Ukraine. Ukraine shies away from intervention with other governments on behalf of its diaspora, i.e. Russian Federation, Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, citing "internal affairs", "good neighbor diplomacy" and even lack of awareness. Ironically, both Russian presidents to date have been significantly less squeamish and diplomatic. This example is not a result simply of Russian arrogance. The Bulgarian government for example voices its concern about some 250 thousand Bulgarians residing in Ukraine. Germany and Poland offer assistance to its brethren residing in foreign countries. Ukraine's leadership is still searching for its role in regards to the diaspora.

 

In 1967 Ukrainians from the United States, Canada, South America, Western Europe and Australia established a global Ukrainian coordinating body, naming it the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, now the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC). With the fall of the iron curtain and the demise of the USSR, the UWC has expanded its role to reach out to less fortunate Ukrainians in the East. The support offered by the UWC has been mostly contact and intervention. In addition to existing Western communities, UWC representatives have visited Ukrainian communities in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Belarus (Minsk and Brest), Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation (Moscow, Bashkortostan, Tyumen, Omsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk). The UWC has communicated with the Slovak government regarding its policy of dividing Ukrainians and Rusyns, the Polish government regarding compensation of concentration camp inmates, condemnation of "Akcija Wisla", community property restitution, the Belarus government regarding registration of Ukrainian non-governmental organizations and the Russian government regarding Ukrainian religious freedom and Ukrainian language schools. Some minimal humanitarian aid as well as other financial support has been given, i.e. flood victims in Romania, support for the elderly, construction of school and church in Kazakhstan, support for Ukrainian language publications in Belarus and Russia etc. Most significant, however, has been the inclusion of the Eastern diaspora within the membership roll of the UWC. The UWC has established systematic communication via newsletters and bulletins, telephone and e-mail communication as well as visits. Belonging to the UWC has strengthened the psychological makeup and political position of the Eastern diaspora communities. UWC representatives have made a point of meeting with government officials during their visits to the Eastern diaspora, underlining their concern with the community's well-being. Remaining communities on the UWC's Eastern diaspora agenda include: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Additionally, the UWC is reaching out to sprouting Ukrainian diaspora communities in the West, most recently, in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Germany and Greece. Much more ahead. We're just getting started!