Feature Interview

IN MANAGEMENT IT IS WIDELY HELD THAT CORPORATE MISSION AND VALUES SHAPE THE WAY AN ORGANIZATION RESPONDS TO ITS ENVIRONMENT. IN THE REALM OF DIPLOMACY, HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE THE MISSION AND VALUES THAT SHAPED YOUR WORK AS A UKRAINIAN AMBASSADOR?

 

Certainly, there are such values, both professional and corporate, but we must bear in mind Ukraine’s particular circumstances. We started almost from scratch and organized a diplomatic service corps that was virtually nonexistent before. I personally was among the first Ukrainian ambassadors. Before I became an ambassador in 1992, only four or five others had been appointed: to the United States, Russia, and France. At that time we all lacked experience, but two groups of diplomats emerged in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) at that time: the so-called “professionals,” career diplomats from MFA staff, and the “amateurs” who came from other ministries. Over time, the divide between them has only increased. Since I had been the Minister of Ecology before my appointment, I was among the “amateurs.” However, this division is totally unfounded. In every country there are diplomats who are political appointees. In the US, for example, they make up 30-40% of the total number, depending on the policy of the president, while the rest are career diplomats. But it would be absurd to say that a senator whom the president has appointed ambassador to a certain country is not a professional.

 

Thus, the small groups of Ukrainian career diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – and until the days of independence there were only about forty of them – worked only in missions to the UN and served the imperialistic interests of the USSR. They were acquainted with multilateral diplomacy, but they had served a different country and had no experience in bi-lateral diplomacy. These are different things. I have deep respect for our mission to the UN, but its job is limited to formulating resolutions and debating burning international issues… In comparison, in my work as Ambassador to the US, I was responsible not only for a wide spectrum of political relations, negotiations, and consultations but for economic relations as well. Later when I was engaged in overseeing relations with international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (my job was to help Ukraine procure loans from them), I gained experience that no Ukrainian diplomat had ever had before.

 

My understanding of diplomacy was formed on the basis of the Constitution, directives of the President who is the Head of Foreign Service, and official instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is common practice among diplomats in the whole world. Yet, my ultimate responsibility was to represent Ukraine to the world. I imagined that I was being observed, that people viewed Ukraine through my actions and my speeches. I tried to represent Ukraine in a favorable light, especially in times when the country was struck by deep economic, moral, and psychological crises. I tried to find positive aspects of Ukrainian life and show them to the world.

 

Certainly, all of Ukraine’s ambassadors developed common “corporate” values that did not depend on the country they worked in. Many of us weren’t even acquainted, but when we got together for our bi-annual meetings we all found something in common. First and foremost, it was a feeling of responsibility for representing Ukraine; and then it was a sense of discipline, because the diplomatic service does not tolerate a lack of discipline. Those who took liberties didn’t stay in the profession too long.

 

YOU HAVE EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SO YOU MUST HAVE NOTICED HOW A COUNTRY’S IMAGE CAN AFFECT ITS GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION. UNFORTUNATELY, UKRAINE DOES NOT HAVE A GOOD REPUTATION IN THE WORLD. IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT DOES UKRAINE HAVE TO DO TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE AND WHO SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THAT EFFORT?

 

One must distinguish between the country’s geopolitical situation and its image. We’ve very successfully established ourselves on the geopolitical map. Look at the Russian press – how much they dislike and envy Ukraine’s relations with NATO. That indicates that we’re in a favorable geopolitical position. For countries like Georgia and Azerbaijan, Ukraine is an example of an independent state that was able to find and affirm its place in the world. So, I would distinguish between a perception of geopolitical position, which is certainly subject to change, and a country’s image or “brand.” Unfortunately, our country lacks positive branding. When we say “Poland,” we think of the Pope, Lech Walensa and his Solidarity party and movement. The Czech Republic is associated with Czech glass, Czech beer, and Czech precision. Every country has its own brand. What kind of brand does Ukraine have? Unfortunately, today it is negative. Moreover, it carries over to its people. This is unfair because Ukrainians who work in Europe, and I’ve met such people in Italy and elsewhere, are very hardworking. Even if they live in terrible conditions, they work hard to make a living.

 

When Ukraine emerged as an independent state, it was credited with great trust. In Washington, people have said “we believed in Ukraine, believed that it would blossom into a European country, but now look at what you’ve made of it…” They believed that it would be possible to completely change the country, to eradicate the communist legacy. Frankly, that was a bit naпve. The West developed inflated expectations for Ukraine that have now given way to disappointment.

 

Today Ukraine is often compared to Poland. Although Poland is our closest neighbor, this comparison isn’t justified. Our countries are absolutely different. Poland is virtually a one-nation state without large ethnic minorities, with a single language, and single faith. Faith is, in fact, very important in Poland. And historically, the Poles have always sought freedom. Recall how the Poles fought against Russian invaders and the Soviet regime.

 

The question about what to do to improve Ukraine’s negative image is very serious. We need to create a positive image and brand for the country. For instance, we could emphasize our progress in the aircraft industry. The Antonov plant manufactures wonderfully reliable airplanes. The Ukrainian missiles used in the Sea Launch program, the American-Ukrainian-Russian-Norwegian project, also deserve serious praise. We could make Ukraine attractive for tourists and offer high quality service to foreign visitors, but to do this we need a wise national policy that creates a favorable environment, keeps prices low, and fights crime, particularly fraud, including credit card fraud.

 

We’re poor and can’t allow ourselves expensive programs, but in any case we must show our achievements to the world. We have enormous cultural treasures, but unfortunately they have not gained international attention. Why are there no Ukrainian authors among the Nobel Prize winners? Can it be that our literature is not worthy in some way? No, the opposite is true. Our poetry is among the finest in the world. There is a different problem. Our books are not properly translated and do not reach international circulation.

 

We must ensure that our cultural values become known in Europe and America. Very few Ukrainian artistic groups visited the USA and Canada when I worked there. We need to expose people to our culture, and not only through the ‘hopak’ which has almost become the national dance in Canada. We have a great number of various choirs, orchestras, theatres, and painters but no strategic program for promoting them. There isn’t a single Ukrainian cultural centre outside the country. Much has been said about creating such a centre in Berlin but it hasn’t been opened yet. We have no cultural representatives in New York or Toronto. There are no television programs about Ukraine; our TV channels don’t broadcast to foreign audiences. Over a six-month period, the BBC broadcast only one story about Ukraine and that single story featured a fight in Parliament.

 

We must invite journalists from different countries, organize study visits for them, cover all their expenses, and get them acquainted with our country and our culture. Even if six out of ten visitors remain indifferent, four of them will become our friends.

 

We have to be more forceful, even aggressive, in establishing ourselves in the world information environment. We must invite foreign correspondents, facilitate their work, and provide information for the BBC, EuroNews and so on. We can’t be afraid of criticism; there will certainly be critical stories but there will be positive reports as well. We are culturally rich and our economy is improving slowly but surely. We cannot permit, in the words of Condoleezza Rice, for Ukraine to remain “the black hole of Europe.” I really dislike this characterization just as I do not like the baseless charges about selling nuclear arms to Pakistan or passing mythical ammunition to Al Qaeda. Ukraine is being made into a scapegoat, and we must not tolerate that.

 

As far as our internal problems are concerned – and they have created a bad image for Ukraine – I am convinced that they’re temporary. Corruption and political instability, confrontations in the Verkhovna Rada - these are signs of a redistribution of wealth. This is very dangerous, but I believe it is a cyclical phenomenon that will come to an end sooner or later.

 

I think that in 5-6 years we will witness a fundamental change of leadership at all levels. Post-soviet leaders will give way to a new generation that speaks foreign languages and whose education meets European standards. There will be new difficulties too since every generation comes with its share of corrupt individuals, but I’m sure the situation in Ukraine will change. Changes in the political scene itself, beginning with presidential and then parliamentary elections, will generate changes in the situation in Ukraine.

 

BY SENDING TROOPS TO IRAQ, UKRAINE JOINED THE COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM. SINCE NO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION HAVE BEEN FOUND IN IRAQ, THE NEED TO GO TO WAR IS BEING QUESTIONED MORE AND MORE IN THE USA AND GREAT BRITAIN. WHAT REPERCUSSIONS CAN THIS HAVE FOR UKRAINE?

 

I fully support the decision of President Kuchma and the National Security Council to send our peacekeeping forces to Iraq. I’d refer here to Yuriy Lypa, a great Ukrainian geo-politician, poet and doctor, and member of the UPA [Ukrainian Insurgent Army] who was killed fighting the Soviet NKVD [People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs]. He wrote about the importance of the southern vision for Ukrainian foreign policy. Today we still cannot fully grasp Ukraine’s prospects southward because we presently only see danger there. Danger indeed exits: several Ukrainian nationals have died there; political difficulties can emerge from any confrontation with the Arab-Muslim world. But I’m confident that Ukraine’s presence in Iraq is very important. We have experience in the oil industry. Many Ukrainians work in the Russia Tumen’ oil wells so we could do the same thing in Iraq and conclude some good business deals.

 

Yet, the most important issue for me is that we joined the coalition against terrorism. We were indecisive, but after all that was said and done, we joined it. I believe that a future global coalition (I have called it the GTO – Global Treaty Organization) will emerge and replace NATO. If we want to improve our geopolitical position, our place is in organizations of this type. So, I’m convinced that it was the right political decision, not to mention the fact that the Ukrainian army was paid for its service. That’s also very important given the present poor financing of the military. Moreover, the first brigade that returned from Iraq has become the basis for a rapid deployment force, since these soldiers were professionally trained and prepared. Currently, they are working on contract and are laying the foundation for a professional army.

 

Certainly, President Bush started the war for much more complex reasons than just to dismantle weapons of mass destruction that Iraq had allegedly possessed. We can candidly say that globalization has brought a new re-division of powers in the world, a process that is still proceeding actively. In the XXI century, competition for oil, energy, and raw materials is becoming fiercer. Americans built their arguments for justifying the war on shaky grounds, without adequate evidence. Yet, another line of argument is the so-called rule of international intervention, an area of international law which is now widely discussed. According to this new doctrine, when people in a country are oppressed by a dictatorial terrorist regime, multinational coalitions have the right to forcibly intervene. This doctrine was outlined in the report of a Canadian commission asked by the UN to study the issue. But, this is a very controversial policy because many people still question the need for intervention in Yugoslavia.

 

IN RUSSIA, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE JUST CONCLUDED, AND IN NOVEMBER, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD IN THE US. WHAT LONG- AND SHORT-TERM STRATEGIES MUST UKRAINE ADOPT IN RELATIONS WITH THESE TWO COUNTRIES?

 

Usually in the year of presidential elections it is unlikely that a country can pay much attention to its foreign policy and develop new initiatives because it is very risky both for the incumbent and for the challengers. Nevertheless, the US leadership could conceivably pay a lot of attention to foreign policy issues if the Democrats start raising the question of whether it was necessary to go to war. That makes me believe it will become an important element of their campaign strategy. As of now, I think both parties have an equal chance. Chances are equal in the sense that the economic situation is not all that bad for Mr. Bush and he can also play on patriotic feelings.

 

Everybody knew that Putin would win. That is why he outlined his foreign political strategy before the election in which Ukraine plays an important role. However, he made no dramatic gestures in this regard before the election.

 

The situation in Ukraine is more complicated. It’s not yet known for sure who will become the majority candidate. The opposition is also divided and it’s impossible to tell whether it will be able to put up a single candidate. In any case, this situation limits our foreign policy choices. In other words, the three countries will be in a transitional period during which you can’t expect any major changes.

 

As far as strategy is concerned, in the short term Ukraine will do the following: firstly, we’ll be actively preparing for the Istanbul NATO summit that will be held in June where, with luck, we’ll sign an agreement on preparation for accession. It will mean that we will have a real chance to join NATO in three years. It’s difficult to foresee how the Common Economic Space will develop. This is a very controversial issue which can cause yet another divide within the opposition. It’s unlikely that any political force would shoulder the responsibility for ratifying or not ratifying the agreement, so the issue will be left undecided. In other words, the powers that be will once again adopt a typical Ukrainian position.

 

As far as a long-term strategy is concerned, unfortunately, nothing particular will happen because everybody will be waiting for the outcome of the presidential elections. For the time being, all the officials and ruling elite are only making plans into November and trying to figure out whether they’ll keep their seats.

 

YOU ARE A KNOWN ADVOCATE OF UKRAINE’S WESTERN, PRO-EUROPEAN CHOICE. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS OF PURSUING THIS COURSE IN LIGHT OF THE AGREEMENT ON FORMING THE COMMON ECONOMIC SPACE WHICH WAS SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT AND WHICH MOVES UKRAINE INTO THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS? AND GIVEN RUSSIA’S EFFORTS, IS IT POSSIBLE THAT IT WILL JOIN NATO AND THE EU EARLIER THAN UKRAINE?

 

I strongly oppose the ratification of the CES agreement because it is not well thought out. The very title contradicts Ukraine’s national interests. Such an agreement should have been called ‘common’ and not ‘single’ space [the Ukrainian and Russian language version of the document use the more pointed ‘single’ economic space, whereas the formal and typically usage in English has been directed to the more Euro-sounding ‘common’ economic space – Romyr]. The formula for creating, say, the European Economic Community was absolutely different from this initiative. The authors of the CES initiative first took care of issues important to Russia (a customs union, other matters) and not the issue of creating a free trade zone. Creating such a zone would not be in Russia’s interest especially where the sale of oil is concerned. If Russia introduces world prices for oil, it will have to live through a deep crisis, one that we have already faced. That’s why I don’t believe that ratification will go smoothly, and even if it is ratified, either it will not be observed or it will be ratified with many amendments and reservations.

 

As far as accession to the EU is concerned, I’m sure that Russia will never join the EU. Moreover, a serious conflict has emerged between the EU, NATO, and Russia. Russia will never join NATO even though it wishes to influence the alliance’s decisions. Today its role in NATO’s affairs is actually more important than that of Ukraine. Russia actively negotiates with NATO to keep it from placing bases in Poland. Russian Defense Minister Ivanov gave a very pointed speech on the matter in Munich. So it’s absurd to think that Russia will become a NATO member, but Russia will do everything possible to prevent Ukraine from joining the alliance. That is clearly Russia’s strategy.

 

IN EARLY FEBRUARY 2004, THE ISSUE OF TUZLA ISLAND BEGAN TO FADE FROM THE PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS; AN OFFICIAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO USE THE PIPELINE TO TRANSPORT OIL WESTWARD TO BRODY; THE MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT SEEMS TO HAVE AGREED TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY DIRECT POPULAR VOTE RATHER THAN BY PARLIAMENT. IN YOUR OPINION, HOW IMPORTANT ARE THESE ISSUES AND HOW CAN THEY AFFECT UKRAINE’S FUTURE?

 

The issues of Tuzla and Brody were quite interesting. In 1996 I negotiated the Brody issue in Washington and I must admit that, at the beginning, the Americans were slow to understand the importance of this direction of oil transit. Instead, they concentrated on the transit of oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Jeikhan in Turkey. Now they are constructing a huge USD 3.5 billion oil pipeline there. But, right now, they seem ready to accept the Ukrainian approach to move oil from Odesa to Brody and Plotsk. Furthermore, Norway’s oil deposits will soon be depleted, and the whole of Northern Europe which now depends on Norwegian oil will in 10-15 years lose that source and will need to bring in oil from elsewhere.

 

As far as the Tuzla conflict is concerned, I believe that, in the first place, it contributed to unite the morale of the Ukrainian people. You know, it’s a paradox but Ukrainians unite only under dramatic circumstances. Otherwise, the nation is very much divided with different clans struggling for power. And in the case of Tuzla, miraculously, the nation stood as one, the Verkhovna Rada reacted instantly and forcefully – one could only dream of that kind of reaction. I remember how our Parliament reacted when the Russian Duma passed the resolution on Sevastopol. At that time, the Parliament was also divided, but it was a matter of self-preservation, of state-preservation, and instinct prevailed.

 

For example when it was finally decided that oil would be transported via Brody to Poland, the newspaper Den published the article under the brilliant headline ‘Ukrainians Win a Victory over Little Russians.’ The government’s decision was very important because there was a difference of opinion within the government itself, but the final decision was made in the national interests of Ukraine. And that’s a very good sign.

 

 As far as the presidential election is concerned, the concession to elect the president by popular vote is a defeat for the majority. If presidential powers are limited, say, to those of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, then a president could be elected in the Parliament. But Parliament can’t elect a president who’s given as much power as he is in Ukraine. It would be sheer nonsense because if a president with that much power were elected by Parliament and then the Prime Minister were also chosen by Parliament; it could certainly create conflicts of interests between the two. So the President should either retain purely representative functions (receive credentials and diplomats) or be elected by popular vote.

 

IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT BORYS TARASIUK WAS DISCHARGED FROM HIS POST AS FOREIGN MINISTER UNDER PRESSURE FROM RUSSIA. DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT, AND, IF SO, HOW DID UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE UNDER ANATOLY ZLENKO? WHAT IMPACT DOES THE CURRENT MINISTER HAVE ON UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY?

 

This is a difficult question. I know it’s said that Tarasiuk’s views were too pro-Western for him to be minister and he was discharged for those views, but the situation was more complicated. But first let’s look at it from another perspective: the work of both officials, Tarasiuk and Zlenko, is regulated by Ukraine’s Constitution, which states that Ukraine’s foreign policy is determined by the President. Our Ministers of Foreign Affairs cannot be compared to the Secretary of State in the US. There, the Secretary of State is the third or fourth most important post in government. In Ukraine, according to Article 106 of the Constitution, the President himself ensures state independence, national security, represents the state in international relations, administers foreign political activity, conducts negotiations and concludes international treaties for Ukraine. He has unlimited power to appoint and dismiss diplomats from the Foreign Minister to a Ukrainian ambassador without the approval of the Verkhovna Rada. So the President is a key figure in making major foreign political decisions. Attached to him is the Administrative Head of Foreign Political Activity, a centre of analysis that prepares documents and recommendations. The Ministry’s only job is to execute presidential orders. The Verkhovna Rada formulates and approves the foundations of the country’s foreign policy and ratifies treaties, it also has the right to control the work of the Ministry, but I believe this control is insignificant.

 

So, a Foreign Minister can’t exercise much influence over foreign policy. If, for example, in 1993 a Minister suggested that Ukraine announce its desire to join NATO, he would have been dismissed the next day. He has no right to do such things; for the same reason, he couldn’t say today that Ukraine should not join NATO. The President has made a decision on this issue and the minister is to comply with it.

 

Anatoly Zlenko is an experienced official with a subtle approach to his work. He’s very cautious so he won’t act dramatically. Our current Foreign Minister Hryshchenko is an experienced diplomat who can be quite tough when national interests are at stake. I saw him at work when we tried to settle the issue of Ukrainian weapons with the Americans. At that time he was a deputy minister. He certainly has a Euro-Atlantic orientation, but he also has to work within certain limits and can’t deviate from the course set by the President. On the other hand, it’s clear that the role of the minister depends on the President’s personal attitude towards him. One minister can see the President every day and can influence his decisions, while another can’t do so simply because he doesn’t have the same access. This makes a big difference.

 

THERE ARE ANALYSTS WHO BELIEVE THAT YEVHEN MARCHUK COULD ENTER THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST THIS YEAR. WHO WOULD BENEFIT AND WHO WOULD LOSE IN THAT SCENARIO? IN YOUR OPINION, CAN MARCHUK’S KGB PAST AFFECT HIS CHANCES OF WINNING?

 

You propose an interesting hypothesis. I have my own theory of a ‘third force.’ You know, it’s like when two boxers are lying exhausted in the ring, a third one appears. I believe that such a third force could emerge. The opposition is becoming weaker; in my opinion, it’s adopted a flawed strategy. There may end up being two opposition candidates: Yushchenko and Moroz. The majority is also divided; it doesn’t have a single candidate either.

 

So, a third force is sure to emerge, if not this year then for the next elections. This force will have a weaker national orientation than, for example, Our Ukraine and many voters will see that as a disadvantage; it won’t be connected with oligarchs or business clans. I don’t know if Marchuk will run for president, but in any case, I have a deep respect for him. I’m sure that his KGB past will be of much less importance now than in the 1994 elections.

 

OVER THE LAST DECADE, INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES SHIFTED THEIR ATTENTION FROM PRIVATIZATION AND OTHER MACROECONOMIC REFORMS TOWARDS DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY, FIGHTING CORRUPTION, BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO MAKE THINGS WORK AND RESPONDING TO THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE POPULATION. NOW THAT YOU’VE RETURNED TO UKRAINE, WHAT KIND OF REFORMS DO YOU SEE AS THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY?

 

I must say that despite the slowdown of reforms or even their absence, the market system is developing. A middle class is emerging between the poor and the oligarchs. Unfortunately, government does nothing to facilitate this process. Everyone who owns property – even if it’s only a kiosk at the marketplace – is part of the middle class. Shuttle traders who used to go to Poland or Turkey and now bring merchandise from Thailand also are part of the middle class. They’re poor and they have to do everything by themselves, but they create wealth, they are already proprietors; they have private business interests.

 

Marx was absolutely right when he wrote that economic interests determine political interests. Remember, only 10 years ago we didn’t have 60% of the institutions associated with a market economy. There was no State Treasury, no securities markets. Now they’re in place, and they operate on their own. But there’s a different problem: politics isn’t independent of the economy; business people sit in the Verkhovna Rada and promote their private interests. That gives rise to corruption which means that certain companies are exempted from common tax and customs policy. There’s also a third problem, an unfavorable investment climate. Certainly, there are examples of successful foreign investment, but mainly, foreign investors are not allowed to access strategically important sectors; they’re not allowed to participate in privatization tenders. Russian investors who have Ukrainian partners or colleagues enjoy a considerable advantage.

 

I see positive trends, but they continue to be slowed by the bureaucratic system. Given this, there’s an urgent need for deregulation, whose consequence will be the disappearance of corruption by itself. If an individual could register his firm in three days and officially pay 100 USD for this service, there would be no need to bribe officials. Now, to solve a minor problem, an entrepreneur has to collect 40-50 signatures which leads to regular abuses. A single payment, a single tax would let an entrepreneur accumulate initial capital that would do good for both the people and the state.

 

We certainly need reform, but a third force is already making its way through the nets of bureaucracy and oligarchy. Bureaucrats have been building a state for themselves and avoiding any responsibility. Unfortunately, their influence is still strong, but they are losing their power. Conversely, a large number of honest entrepreneurs are appearing who will be able to form their own pressure groups for the next election. What is the significance of drivers of taxi-buses in various Ukrainian cities going out on strike? These are the first signs of an emerging middle class with its own economic and political interests. When our entrepreneurs have the chance to influence politics, they will be able to do a lot. We need a sweeping change of leadership, not just in the presidency but a change of mentality, of the attitude towards the middle class. Then there will be no need for instructions on what, where, and how much should be sent, everything will happen automatically, because that’s the way markets operate.

 

Prerequisites for civilized regulation of market mechanisms are in place: there is a well-developed taxation function, banks have started issuing loans, and a state credit policy has been adopted, however imperfect it may be. Land issues are yet to be dealt with as next year land will become a commodity eligible for sale. But the key factor is membership in the WTO. It will impose great responsibilities on Ukraine, but at the same time, it will open up new opportunities. After that, the economic revolution will enter its second phase. The first phase started with capitalization and the creation of market mechanisms and the second one will begin when real competition appears.

 

YOU HAVE RECENTLY PUBLISHED THE BOOK “UKRAINE: CHALLENGE AND CHOICE,” AND ON THE WHOLE, YOUR WORK AND YOUR INTERESTS ARE AIMED AT DEFINING UKRAINE’S ROLE IN THE WORLD. WHAT WOULD YOU ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: QUO VADIS, UKRAINE? QUO VADIS, YURI SCHERBAK? HOW DO YOU SEE UKRAINE IN 10 YEARS?

 

My age severely restricts my ability to make long-term plans. I want to write another book that will include many personal memories, assessments and projections. It is very important for me to write a book about my personal fate and Ukraine’s fate because I can’t separate one from the other.

 

What is happening in Ukraine and where is it heading? As an academic and a person who deals with strategic issues, I always consider three possible scenarios: optimistic, pessimistic, and intermediate. So, the following is the optimistic scenario: Ukraine prospers and becomes a member of all the key European institutions. On the whole, this is a realistic scenario, but it will be extremely difficult to realize.

 

WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF THIS SCENARIO?

 

Twenty to 25 percent. The likelihood of the pessimistic scenario is the same – about twenty percent. It will mean a loss of sovereignty and a return to the empire. I don’t really believe it will happen because the European Union is nearby and whatever its attitude to us, we are becoming strategically important for Europe and NATO. Even if we don’t become members of these organizations, we will still be their neighbors, and these organizations aren’t interested in a troubled neighbor.

 

Neither do I believe in the likelihood of the negative scenario because I hope that America’s position will be determined not by Condoleezza Rice but by its national interests. And America is interested in a sovereign Ukraine.

 

Then there is the intermediate possibility: Ukraine remains a sovereign state; we have trains that reach Odesa or Kharkiv in three hours - in my opinion, this will become an important factor for the country’s integration. Boryspil International Airport will develop into the Frankfurt Airport of Eastern Europe. Ukraine will continue to be largely dependent on Russia because its powerful neighbor has a strong influence in the oil and gas markets. This needs to be taken into account. There is no need to fan antagonisms with Russia; it is necessary to find ways to coexist with it. According to my estimates, Ukraine is ten years behind Poland, so in about ten years we should live like Poland does today.

 

The process of reconstructing housing and businesses will continue; we will approach European standards (although not in all spheres of life), for we are a European nation. This intermediate scenario may also be quite optimistic, but I believe that this is what will happen. I believe in the future of Ukraine.