Foreign Affairs

 

The past few years have ushered in a new era of relations between the European Union and its eastern neighbors. An unprecedented enlargement of ten countries entering the Union on May 1, a new constitution drafted to provide the legal underpinnings of member relations, and the development of a long-term common policy towards its neighbors (including Ukraine) are the hallmarks of a new Europe. Over the past decade, Ukraine’s efforts to move closer to the EU have fallen well short of earning an invitation for full membership. Indeed, it is commonly believed that it will be another ten to twenty years before the former Soviet state can hope to start negotiations for entry.

 

With the end of the Cold War, Europe experienced a surge of positive energy manifested in the Shengen agreement, a common currency, and EU enlargement. That tide and its related goodwill have receded as member nations realize that the challenge at hand is to concentrate on internal rather than external issues; to successfully complete full integration rather than continue along the path of ambitious expansion. Reaching consensus with a constituency of 25 states will be a continuous, daunting task as was clearly illustrated last December by Poland’s uncompromising posture regarding the European Constitution. Despite having no immediate prospects for entry, and although EU membership has not been nirvana for allies in the former Soviet sphere, Ukraine remains committed to eventual EU membership and the promise of enjoying a higher standard of living.

 

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF UKRAINIAN-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

 

Although Ukrainians often claim that the country’s character and traditions make it an integral part of Europe, Ukraine’s development over the past ten years of independence has done little to support that notion. The disparate behavior and norms in the area of politics is particularly striking and the source of major misunderstandings between Ukrainian and European leaders.

 

The argument that Ukraine belongs to Europe sounds attractive but is ambiguous. Since the Middle Ages, many influential Ukrainian thinkers and statesmen, Petro Mohyla, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, and Ivan Mazepa among them, were educated in Europe and sowed the seeds of European values in Ukraine. On the other hand, centuries of armed conflict with western neighbors and a commitment to Orthodox Christianity pushed Ukraine in the opposite direction. Relations between Ukraine and Europe were further hindered by Peter I and subsequent rulers who permitted Ukraine to associate with Europe only through the filter of the Russian empire. The call “away from Moscow, towards Europe!” by Mykola Khvylyovyi during a period of national rebirth in the 1920s witnesses not only the sincere desire by Ukrainian elites to join Europe psychologically but also the fact that they were not a part of it.

 

However one interprets history, it remains a fact that in the past decade Ukraine has had to virtually rediscover its European identity in many matters. With the attainment of independence and the formulation of the idea of the European Union as a “common European home,” the possibility of Ukraine entering this home gained concrete institutional form. As early as 1993, through the voice of their Verkhovna Rada, Ukrainians clearly proclaimed the idea of a European choice for Ukraine. Subsequently, in June 1998, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Ukraine and the EU was signed – a basic document that so far continues to determine Ukraine’s relationship with the EU. Although the Agreement does not provide for automatic accession to the EU, since 1994 the EU strategy has declared Ukraine’s membership in the Union as a long-term strategic goal.

 

Since 2003, EU policy on Ukraine and other neighboring countries has been regulated by the ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations’ initiative that stems from the ‘Wider Europe’ concept adopted in June of that year. One of the initiative’s key principles is the development of a phased action plan for each neighbouring country. The stimulus for implementing these plans (which incorporate accepted EU political and economic criteria) is the progressive expansion of economic and political ties of each country with the EU, softening of visa requirements, and activation of cooperation in a wide variety of areas, etc.

 

Although the ideas in the Wider Europe Concept appear quite attractive, Ukrainian authorities received them with disappointment since they actually reject the idea of associated membership in the EU in the near future. At the 6th Ukraine-EU Summit held last October in Yalta, both sides agreed to launch consultations on the development of a Wider Europe Action Plan for Ukraine.

 

UKRAINE’S INTERNAL POLICY AND ITS EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH THE EU

 

It is clear that the main reasons for the more reserved EU attitude towards Ukraine over the past few years and lowering of expectations for accelerated accession to the EU. Ukraine’s image suffers from a deteriorating political climate which is far from any European standard of democracy. The Gongadze affair, attempts to carry out political reform that have deteriorated into a constitutional crisis, and the leadership’s stonewalling of opposition voices have all strained Ukraine-EU relations. The sharply worded PACE resolution on Ukraine’s dubious political reform and terse declarations from Ireland on behalf of the entire EU community are two indications of frustration on the part of Europe as it deals with its eastern cousin.

 

While Ukraine’s opposition parties draw support from Europe, it is ironically today’s governing party which is among the strongest advocates of Ukraine’s integration into the EU. Explaining the paradox, observers point out that behind the common pro-European rhetoric, different political forces give three different meanings to the notion of European choice. “Into Europe with Russia” is the philosophy shared by the left including the Communists and some centrists from the Ukraine Labor Party. “Rush into Europe” is the battle cry of the ruling elite and its supporters, while the right wing supports a simple “Into Europe” approach.

 

Overall, those in power create the impression that Ukraine does not take the question of European integration very seriously. In its dialogue with Europe, Ukraine is demanding and exudes enormous self-confidence leaving the impression that the country wishes to enter an elite club of affluent democracies without enduring the political and economic transition necessary for matriculation.

 

Meanwhile, it seems that for the leaders in Kyiv, European integration is a “background process,” not a real stimulus to solve concrete problems. In labeling Europe the new Promised Land, Ukraine’s rulers promote a new western-hued ideology of Euro-integration, which, in the minds of Ukrainian citizens, replaces the myth of a communist utopia. One can draw many parallels between the two concepts. Both provide a philosophy for a political powerbase. Both promise people better days ahead. Finally, both are a means of manipulating public opinion; today, the ‘European approach’ label is pinned on virtually any government initiative.

 

UKRAINIAN-EU RELATIONS IN THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

 

In their dealings with Europe, Ukrainian officials have been harsh even resorting to the use of blackmail. While that tactic has sometimes brought success in negotiations with NATO, Ukraine seems to ignore the fact that its relations with the EU are of an entirely different nature. NATO, the United States, and Russia view Ukraine as an important strategic partner, but to a united Europe, it is just another piece of land to the East. While NATO is primarily concerned with Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities, the EU concentrates its interest on the country’s domestic policy, an area where Ukraine has little about which it can boast. For Europeans, the issues of major concern regarding Ukraine are illegal immigration, environmental protection, and diversification of energy resources. In fact, of these, only the latter is of real strategic importance.

 

Today an expanded Europe is developing a new perspective on its relations with its immediate eastern neighbors as well as with Russia and the US. Energy dependence concerns make Europe apt to establish closer links with Russia in turn making the EU more sensitive to Russia’s interests in Ukraine. Regarding the US, when EU leaders France and Germany sharply opposed the American invasion of Iraq, the general harmony of transatlantic relations was disrupted despite bilateral efforts to temper the ill will.

 

The war in Iraq also exposed schisms within Europe itself when a European Atlantic fringe, particularly Spain, Italy, UK, Denmark, as well as most of the Eastern European countries stood firmly in support of the US-led military operation. Indeed, from Ukraine’s point of view, the pro-American coalition generally tends to demonstrate a more favorable attitude towards Ukraine and shows more enthusiasm about its prospects for EU integration. Italian President Silvio Berlusconi expressed his desire that Ukraine’s enter the EU at the last Ukraine-EU summit in Yalta, while Poland, which is due to join the EU in May 2004, has always been supportive of Ukraine’s future in the EU. Nevertheless, those advocating for Ukraine lack the clout of EU powerhouses France and Germany.

 

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

 

While the EU has maintained a clear and consistent posture towards Ukraine, Ukraine has reached no consensus on its strategy and tactics for pursuing European integration, a fact that further jeopardizes realizing the goal. That is unlikely to change over the short term as internal political processes are set in motion for the upcoming presidential elections. Europe looks unfavorably on the raucous, unproductive relations between Ukraine’s power elite and its opposition, and with a contentious campaign on the horizon, that perception is not apt to alter. Even to observers who consider Ukraine probable for EU membership in the long run, the country’s chances will be primarily determined not by economic reforms but by success in transition to a civilized form of democracy, an historical weak spot.

 

Optimistically, one might hypothesize that after the upcoming EU expansion in May 2004, some in Europe will set their sights on further enlargement. With several new EU members having close economic ties with Ukraine, it would be natural to expect strong support for Ukrainian membership. For now, unfortunately, Ukraine can approach Europe only tangentially through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and NATO. Still, the EU is keeping a close eye on Ukraine and will hold its leadership accountable for the conduct of domestic policy. This was evident by the body’s strong reaction to attempts to amend the Ukrainian Constitution only months before the presidential elections.

 

In trying to woo Europe, Ukraine can trumpet its potential pivotal role in the area of energy resources, particularly emphasizing the benefits to be had by the EU from the Odesa-Brody pipeline. The country can also move towards becoming a full market economy, a realistic goal even in the short term.

 

Although some economists criticize the EU for its inefficiency and bureaucracy, to Ukraine, membership in the EU means more than deriving purely economic benefits. By becoming a fully integrated member of the EU, Ukraine will avoid the risk of remaining a grey zone on the periphery of geographic Europe. For Ukraine, European integration is a matter of integrity, a question of fortifying its national identity.